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CIA-RDP78-04718A001600050014-6

7 Feb



Recommendation #2 - Supplementary -

The basic recommendation restricts itself to suggesting that an accelerated program be developed for completing polygraph interviews of all employees on duty at Headquarters.

A review of the basic text (pp. 31-35) raised the following questions or, by inference, contained the following recommendations:

a. It is now Agency policy that all applicants receive an initial polygraph interview before entering on duty (p. 32, paragraph 4). Is this policy being carried out on a current basis?

b. The most recent report from the Security Office shows that all employees at Headquarters had received a polygraph interview excepting seven who were on vacation.

1. Have these seven now been polygraphed?
2. If not, by what date will this be accomplished?
3. Are all returnees to Headquarters being given a polygraph interview on a prompt and current basis?

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Recommendations #3 and 4 - Supplementary -

Subject recommendations call for the development of a procedure on the handling of operational clearances which will eliminate duplicatory searching of RI files by Security personnel. They also call for a binding Regulation on the subject.

Information furnished by your office indicates that an agreement has been developed, containing a new procedure and that a Regulation has also been developed. Pertinent questions at this time are:

- a. Has the Deputy Director (Plans) accepted the agreement and the proposed Regulation?
- b. Has the duplicatory searching of RI files by Security personnel been eliminated?
- c. The recommendation was made (p. 19) that the six to eight Security personnel engaged in this work be reassigned elsewhere. Has this been done?
- d. The recommendation was made (pp. 21 and 22) that the Security Office must be kept informed as to actual use or change of use of operationally cleared persons. Does the agreement on operational clearances and/or the Regulation thereon contain provisions which will assure this?
- e. Has the T/O been reduced by reason of the elimination of the duplicate function? By how many positions has or will the T/O be reduced?

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Recommendation #5 - Supplementary -

The basic recommendation calls for the submission by 1 November 1954 of the names of "covert operational employees and those engaging in proprietary operations." The language used in this recommendation is technically obscure.

Questions:

- a. Has the Deputy Director (Plans) submitted the requested list of names?
- b. If not, can your office provide information concerning the action taken by the Deputy Director (Plans) to ensure the compilation of such a listing and the date by which its submission is expected?
- c. Was the recommendation interpreted to include all categories of operational employees and agents; if not, on which categories have you requested the Deputy Director (Plans) to submit a listing?

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Recommendation #6 - Supplementary -

The last information received from your office indicates that it was planned by the Deputy Director (Plans) to hold a conference on this matter some time following 15 September 1954.

Question:

What is the current status of the joint efforts of the Director of Security and the Deputy Director (Plans) to solve this problem?

The text on pages 10 and 11 concerning the emergency destruction program contains the following statements:

- a. Responsibility for developing an overseas emergency destruction program has not been clearly assigned (p. 10, paragraph 2).
- b. Policy and program planning appear logically to be the responsibility of the Security Office (p. 10, paragraph 3).
- c. The Security Office should draft an emergency program (p. 10, paragraph 4).
- d. Attention should be paid to the development of sufficient and adequate devices and methods for the quick destruction of classified files and equipment (p. 10, paragraphs 5 and 6).

Questions:

- a. Have the policy determinations as to the relative responsibilities of the Director of Security and the Deputy Director (Plans) for the development and implementation of a world-wide emergency destruction program been effected?
- b. If not, what action has been taken to develop a proposal for submission to appropriate authorities?

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Recommendation #7 - Supplementary -

The recommendation is that the Deputy Director (Administration) should personally review the status of the Agency's safety program and take steps to ensure that an adequate program is put into effect. Underlying this recommendation the survey on page 31 makes the following comments or recommendations:

- a. That CIA does not have a sufficiently developed safety program.
- b. That higher grades and additional positions are a prerequisite to a satisfactory program.
- c. That explosives and dangerous chemicals are stored improperly.
- d. That construction plans are not being adequately coordinated with the CIA Safety Office.

In order that a basic recommendation can be properly acted upon, it would appear necessary for the Director of Security to submit a written report outlining each major phase of the current and proposed safety program, together with the manpower, equipment and budgetary requirements necessary to accomplish the program. Unless this is done, and the Deputy Director (Administration) approves and authorizes such a program, it does not seem possible to consider this recommendation as having been carried out.

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Recommendation #11 - Supplementary -

Subject recommendation calls for a review of the need for 118 unlisted telephones and 162 badges and limited passes issued to non-CIA employees, and determination of appropriate action. Under date of 16 September 1954 your office replied to this recommendation. A perusal of this reply, however, seems to leave the following questions unanswered:

- a. What are existing policies regarding the issuing of badges and passes to non-CIA employees?
- b. Are pass holders briefed by CIA regarding the privileges and responsibilities and limitations imposed upon them?
- c. What control, if any, is actually exercised over the movements and actions of pass holders, i.e., limitations as to hours of entry, or limitations to specific buildings only?

In other words, to successfully respond to this recommendation it appears that what is called for is demonstration of the fact that there is a practical necessity to issue such passes, that reasonable precautions are being taken to ensure that they are not abused, and that optimum safeguards have been established.

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Approved For Release 2002/01/11 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001600050014-6

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Recommendation #20 -

c. Page 22, paragraph 3, indicates that the Cover Branch is over-staffed by three professionals and one clerk.

Questions:

- a. Does the Director of Security concur?
- b. What action has been taken or will be taken to reduce the T/O and reassign the individuals?

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Recommendation #20 -

q. Page 43, paragraph 6, recommends that the Security Control Staff be established as the focal point for all clearances in connection with the External Training Program of the Office of Training.

Questions:

- a. Does the Director of Security concur?
- b. What action has been or will be taken?

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Recommendation #20 -

r. Page 28 indicates that the reinvestigation program has lagged during recent years, due to the fact that the capabilities of the Security Office have been overburdened with the accomplishment of initial investigations. In the Fiscal Year 1954 only 57 on-duty employees were reinvestigated on a routine basis.

Questions:

a. What is the current policy and program for routine reinvestigations of on-duty employees?

b. How many on-duty employees will be reinvestigated in Fiscal Year 1955?

c. Is this rate of reinvestigation adequate to place the program on a long-term cyclical basis?

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